Property dualism

What technical term is used to describe how an experience feels?

• Category Mistake

• Qualia

• Divisibility

• Neuroscience

Which of these arguments for Dualism is NOT named in the specification?

• Qualia

• Zombies

• Conceivability

• Knowledge Argument

According to Chalmers, what is proved by the Zombie argument?

• The conceivability of a zombie means that identity theory is incorrect and property dualism must be supported

• The existence of a zombie means that identity theory is incorrect and property dualism must be supported

• The conceivability of a zombie means that identity theory is correct and property dualism is false

• The conceivability of a zombie means that Descartes is incorrect and identity theory must be supported

Which of these best describes property dualism?

• There are two substances with two distinct sets of properties

• There is just physical substance but there are two distinct sets of properties

• There is just physical substance and physical properties

• All that exists are minds and their ideas

Which of these thinkers supports property dualism?

• Paul Churchland

• Frank Jackson

• Gilbert Ryle

• John Searle

Which of these responses does NOT answer the zombie argument?

• A philosophical zombie is not actually conceivable

• Even if a zombie is conceivable, it does not mean that it is metaphysically possible

• Even if the zombie is possible, this tells us nothing about the actual world

• The existence of zombies cannot be proved

According to Frank Jackson, what does Mary not have until she leaves the black and white room?

• Ability Knowledge

• Intentionality

• Qualia

• Ideas about colour

Which of these problems is articulated by Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia in her correspondence with Descartes?

• The Conceptual interaction problem

• The Empirical interaction problem

• The problem of other minds

• Category Mistakes

Which of these theories is a response that dualists make to the problem of interaction?

• Eliminativism

• Epiphenomenalism

• Functionalism

• Anomalous Monism

Which of these issues is NOT a problem for Epiphenomenalists?

• The issue of explaining self-knowledge

• Our intuitive certainty about our own mental life

• The Mental phenomena seems to serve no evolutionary purpose

• The theory is unable to explain multiple realisability